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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 I. 
We are asked to determine whether an affidavit 
prepared by a law enforcement officer provided a substantial 
basis for a Pennsylvania district justice=s finding of probable 
cause to issue a search warrant.  Appellant Stephen 
Miknevich was arrested and charged with possession of child 
  3 
pornography.  These charges arose after police executed a 
search warrant at his home and seized his computer.  His 
computer was later found to contain numerous images of 
child pornography.  After the search and seizure of the 
computer, Miknevich gave oral and written admissions of 
guilt to the arresting officers.   
 
Miknevich then filed a motion to suppress in the 
District Court, arguing that the warrant was issued without 
probable cause.  The District Court denied the motion, 
finding that the accompanying affidavit contained an adequate 
description of child pornography so as to support a probable 
cause determination and, even had it not, the Leon good faith 
exception applied.  See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984).  Miknevich entered a conditional plea of guilty, 
reserving the right to challenge the District Court=s probable 
cause determination on appeal.  He filed a notice of appeal 
raising this issue and also challenging his sentence.  We will 
affirm. 
 
 II. 
 
Because the contents of the affidavit are at issue, we 
will quote from it directly as follows: 
 
On 8/16/2007 at Approx. 1559 hr EDT, 
Delaware State Police Cpt. R. Scott Garland 
was conducting an investigation into the use of 
P2P file sharing networks in the distribution of 
child pornography images and movies in 
violation of Pennsylvania Crime Code Section 
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631 (C), (D), Sexual Abuse of Children 
(Possession and dissemination of Child 
Pornography).  While conducting this 
investigation, an off-the-shelf publically 
available gnutella client was used.  At this 
time, the network was queried for files indexed 
by a term I know to be related to child 
pornography.  The network returned to Det. 
Garland=s computer a list of files associated 
with this term.  The list contained details about 
these files including the file name, file type, file 
size, SHA1 value for the file and a number of 
users on the network with the file or portions of 
the file available for download by other gnutella 
network users. 
 
Det. Garland reviewed the list of files and 
observed a file named, A!!Novo 
Ptsc-Alyo(6yo)&Ali(7yo) Ptsc-littlenorwegian 
angels stroke their erect clits-nudist child,@with 
an SHA1 value of 
RGQCV2AC6XD3JE5KULOBAJWQTVBBX
XHC.  Det. Garland knows this file with this 
SHA1 value to be child pornography.  The 
movie is described as children, under the age of 
eighteen years old engaged in sexual acts and/or 
poses.  Det. Garland then attempted to 
download this movie form (sic) those sharing it 
on the network. 
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Shortly after Det. Garland indicated to 
download the movie, the network returned a list 
of users with their IP address, who had the file 
or portions of the file available to download 
from it.  Det. Garland reviewed this list and 
observed a user with the IP address of 
75.75.148.179.  The software was set to locate 
computers sharing images of child pornography. 
 Det. Garland was presented with an IP address 
of 75.75.148.179 and captured this IP address 
by performing a ANetstat capture@ on 8/16/2007 
@ 1559 hrs. EDT. 
 
Lt. Peifer viewed the video file based on the 
SHA1 value and based on my training and 
experience the children appear to be under the 
age of 18 years old. 
 
On 9/17/2007, Lt. Peifer prepared a Court Order 
in the Court of Common Pleas in Delaware 
County [Pennsylvania] directing Comcast Cable 
Communications to supply subscriber 
information on the person assigned to IP 
address 75.75.148.179 on 8/06/2007 @ 1559 hrs 
ESDT.  This order was submitted to Delaware 
County Common Please (sic) Court Judge Frank 
T. Hazel. 
 
On 9/21/2007 at approx. 1616 hrs Lt. Peifer 
received a response from Comcast Cable 
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Communications in reference to the court order 
sent. 
 
Comcast indicated that the IP address 
75.75.148.179 on 8/16/2007 @1559 hrs EDT 
was in use by the following subscriber in the 
name of: 
 
Steven Miknevich, 72 Pincecrest Ave., Lft, 
Dallas, Pa. 18612 PH# 570-760-7643. 
 
Based on this information, Pennsylvania State Trooper 
Michael Gownley averred to a Pennsylvania district justice 
that computer images depicting children less than eighteen 
years of age engaged in sexual conduct were located at 
Miknevich=s residence and that those depictions were 
evidence of a crime involving the sexual abuse of children.  
Gownley obtained a warrant and seized Miknevich=s 
computer.   
 
Miknevich argues that the warrant is infirm because 
the Pennsylvania district justice premised his probable cause 
determination on the file name and its related electronic 
identification SHA1 value
1
, not on his or the investigating 
                                                 
1.
A SHA1 (or SHA-1) value is a mathematical 
algorithm that stands for Secured Hash Algorithim used to 
compute a condensed representation of a message or data file. 
 Thus it can act like a fingerprint.  See, e.g., Lexmark Intern., 
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 530 
(6th Cir. 2004).   
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officers= viewing of the file=s contents.  Further, he maintains 
that the only officer who did view the file did not say that he 
saw child pornography and that the district justice only 
inferred as much.  According to Miknevich,  speculation 
cannot be the basis upon which a probable cause 
determination is made. 
 
 III. 
We first distinguish between the standards that govern 
our review.
2
  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court=s evaluation of the Pennsylvania district justice=s 
probable cause determination because the District Court 
limited its decision to the information contained in the 
warrant affidavit.  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 
526 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 
540, 554 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because our review of the District 
Court=s decision denying Miknevich=s motion to suppress is 
plenary, we apply the same deferential standard that the 
District Court applied in reviewing the initial probable cause 
determination.  United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1055 
(3d Cir. 1993).  That is, we must pay Agreat deference@ to the 
magistrate=s initial determination of probable cause.  Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
3
 
                                                 
2.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. ' 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 
1291. 
3.
Although the warrant was issued by a Pennsylvania 
district justice, its validity is governed by federal law.  United 
States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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Thus, in reviewing the probable cause assessment, we 
do not undertake a de novo review of whether probable cause 
actually existed.  Jones, 994 F.2d at 1054.  Instead, like that 
of the District Court, our role is limited to ensuring that a 
magistrate
4
 had a Asubstantial basis@ for concluding that the 
affidavit supporting the warrant established probable cause.  
Id. at 1054-55; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.  When we 
make this assessment, we confine ourselves Ato the facts that 
were before the magistrate judge, i.e., the affidavit, and do not 
consider information from other portions of the record.@  
Jones, 944 F.2d at 1055.  Moreover, Athe resolution of 
doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely 
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.@  Id. 
at 1057-58.  With that said, however, the great deference 
afforded a magistrate=s determination Adoes not mean that 
reviewing courts should simply rubber stamp a magistrate=s 
conclusion.@  United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1117 (3d 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Sanchez v. United States, 
466 U.S. 904 (1984). 
 
                                                 
4.
We use the term Amagistrate@ generally, referring to 
any member of the judiciary B federal or state B who has the 
authority to issue warrants. 
The principles governing a probable cause 
determination are well established.  A magistrate may find 
probable cause when, viewing the totality of the 
circumstances, Athere is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.@  
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Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
not required.  Id. at 235.  Further, if a substantial basis exists 
to support the magistrate=s probable cause finding, we must 
uphold that finding even if a Adifferent magistrate judge might 
have  found the affidavit insufficient to support a warrant.@  
United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993).   
The duty of a reviewing court is Asimply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . concluding that 
probable cause existed.@  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.  We have 
held that Aprobable cause is a fluid concept@ that turns on Athe 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not 
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.@  
United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 277 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).  The supporting affidavit to a 
search warrant is to be read in its entirety and in a common 
sense, nontechnical manner.  See United States v. Williams, 
124 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
    IV. 
 
Miknevich argues that the affidavit of probable cause 
was deficient because it did not contain enough information to 
give the Pennsylvania district justice a substantial basis to 
conclude that there was a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of criminal activity would be found on his computer. 
 He points to several alleged defects:  the affidavit does not 
indicate that any investigating officer actually downloaded the 
suspect video file; the affidavit does not indicate that anyone 
ever actually viewed the suspect file; and the affidavit 
contains no description of the suspected images or actions in 
these files. 
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We credit Miknevich=s criticism of the affidavit as far 
as it goes.  The affidavit was, in parts, inartfully drafted.  
This stems, no doubt, from the fact that the affiant took no 
direct part in the investigation, and instead related the work of 
other law enforcement officials B Det. Garland and Lt. Peifer. 
 Although the District Court relied on the fact that the 
affidavit did not state that Garland never viewed the contents 
of the file, the opposite is equally true B the affidavit does not 
specifically state that he did.  Garland conducted a search for 
suspected child pornography using a term he knew to be 
related to that crime.  But  Garland does not indicate what 
that term was.  His search generated a list of files associated 
with this term, but Garland does not provide the district 
justice with a detailed description of what those files depict.  
After reviewing the list, one file with a particular SHA1 value 
was noticed.  Garland Aknew this file and this SHA1 value to 
be child pornography.@  The detective, however, does not 
indicate how he knew this information. 
 
It is not unreasonable for us to assume that Garland 
never actually viewed the images or videos.  The affidavit 
relates that he Aattempted@ to download the file contents, 
which, we could conclude, means he was unsuccessful and 
never actually viewed the contents of the files in question.  
Further, Garland indicates that A[t]he movie is described as 
children, under the age of eighteen years old engaged in 
sexual acts and/or poses.@  Here, Garland relies on what 
could be a second-hand description of the file=s contents B not 
his own viewing of the contents.  That, however, does not 
make the affidavit infirm. 
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Garland forwarded his search results to Lt. Peifer of 
the Delaware County Pennsylvania Internet Crimes Against 
Children Task Force.  The Government maintains that Peifer 
did indeed view the file=s contents.  Here again, the affidavit 
is imprecise, relating that Piefer Aviewed the video file based 
on the SHA1 value and based on [his] training and experience 
the children appear to be under the age of 18 years old.@  The 
statement that he viewed the file Abased on its SHA1 value@ is 
 confusing.  It could indicate that Peifer merely viewed the 
file as part of the listing generated by the search.  Assuming, 
however, that Peifer did view the contents of the file, he 
nonetheless failed to describe any of the images contained 
therein with any detail.  He avers, based on his training and 
experience, that the children Aappear to be@ under the age of 
eighteen.  Additionally, although the affidavit does state that 
Peifer is Afamiliar with Peer-to-Peer file sharing,@ it does not 
relate the extent of Peifer=s experience and training.   
 
Thus, our review of the affidavit leaves a clear 
impression: the state magistrate was presented with an 
affidavit that provided no factual details regarding the 
substance of the images in question.  Although either the 
actual production of the images, or a sufficiently detailed 
description of them, satisfies the Fourth Amendment=s 
probable cause requirement, an insufficiently detailed or 
conclusory description cannot.  See New York v. P.J. Video, 
475 U.S. 868, 874 (1986).  We believe, however, that even 
given the infirmities we highlighted, the affidavit still 
contained information sufficient to permit a finding of 
probable cause by the magistrate. 
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 A. 
 
It is clear that a magistrate can determine probable 
cause without seeing the images and/or viewing the contents 
of an illicit computer file.  The Supreme Court has stated 
that: 
 
[W]e have never held that a magistrate must 
personally view allegedly obscene films prior to 
issuing a warrant authorizing their seizure.  On 
the contrary, we think that a reasonably specific 
affidavit detailing the content of a film 
generally provides an adequate basis for the 
magistrate to determine whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the film is 
obscene, and whether a warrant authorizing the 
seizure of the film should issue. 
 
P.J. Video, 475 U.S. at 847.  We therefore reject any 
suggestion that a magistrate must review the contents of the 
actual files in question, or that a search warrant must include 
copies of the images giving rise to the request for a warrant.
5
  
                                                 
5.
Although a magistrate is not required to do so, at least 
one jurist has urged his colleagues to view such files.  Judge 
John Adams of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio recently wrote a passionate opinion 
(albeit on sentencing), imploring reviewing courts to 
Apersonally examine the images at issue and not simply rely 
on a written description of their contents.  There are some 
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Although magistrates do not have to view these files, the 
question more pertinent here is whether the investigating 
officers must do so. 
 
It can be problematic, to say the least, when a warrant 
application leaves one questioning whether anyone viewed the 
contents of the file in question.  Nothing in the opinion we 
announce today should be taken as a rejection or relaxation of 
what we believe continues to be the best procedure for law 
enforcement officials to follow.  It remains the better practice 
for an applicant seeking a warrant based on images of alleged 
child pornography to append the images or to provide a 
description of the images sufficient to enable the magistrate to 
determine independently whether probable cause exists.  See, 
                                                                                                             
images that are haunting and they cannot be unseen.  
However, any uneasiness felt by the individual reviewing the 
images pales in comparison to the harm caused by the image 
being created in the first place.@  United States v. 
Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 854 (N.D. Ohio 2010); see 
also United States v. Fiorella, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1075 n.8 
(N.D. Iowa 2009) (AIt is easier to overlook the horrors of child 
pornography when, as is often the case, the material at issue is 
not presented to the sentencing judge.  For purposes of 
efficiency and minimization of re-victimization of the 
children depicted, the government and the defendant will 
often (and rightly so) enter into stipulations about the number 
and nature of the photographs at issue.  But the horrors of 
child pornography are real even if those who sit in judgment 
do not have occasion to view them.@). 
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e.g., United States v. LaFortune, 520 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 
2008).  Here, however, the magistrate could have drawn a 
reasonable inference of the file=s contents based on its highly 
descriptive name and SHA1 value. 
 
 B. 
 
Determining the existence (or lack) of probable cause 
involves making a Apractical, common-sense decision@ as to 
whether, given the totality of facts, a Afair probability@ exists 
that contraband will be found in a particular place.  Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238.  Probable cause can be inferred by 
Aconsidering the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, 
the suspect=s opportunity for concealment and normal 
inferences about where a criminal might hide the fruits of his 
crime.@  United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, we have 
specifically instructed that an affidavit filed in support of an 
application for a search warrant is to be read in its entirety, 
with the focus on what the affidavit includes, not what is 
missing.  See Williams, 124 F.3d at 420; Jones, 994 F.2d at 
1056. 
 
The affidavit here provided the magistrate with 
sufficient information to make an independent assessment of 
probable cause.  The title of the computer file at issue 
contained highly graphic references to specific sexual acts 
involving children.  The file name refers to the ages of the 
children (A6yo@ and A7yo@) and to graphic sexual activities 
(Alittle norwegian angels stroke their erect clits@).  This 
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description indicates minors engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct.  The unmistakable inference arising from this highly 
descriptive file name is that the file=s contents include 
material pertaining to the sexual exploitation of children.  
Given the name of the file in question and its graphic 
reference to specific sexual acts involving young children, 
and given the file=s SHA1 value, this inference is a strong one 
and established probable cause. 
 
We recognize that file names are not always a 
definitive indication of actual file content and, therefore, only 
after downloading and viewing a particular file can one know 
with certainty whether the content of the file is consistent with 
its designated name.  However, A[c]ertainty has no part in a 
probable cause analysis.@  United States v. Frechette, 583 
F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 
527; United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 774 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Tehfe, 722 F.2d at 117-18).  On the contrary, 
Aprobable cause requires only a probability or substantial 
chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such 
activity.@ Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13.  We acknowledge that 
in some circumstances a computer file name may not provide 
meaningful insight into its contents, especially where the file 
name contains a term or name that is commonplace or 
otherwise capable of different interpretations.  However, it 
does not necessarily follow that file names can never be 
regarded as a logical indication of the file=s contents.  A file=s 
name may certainly be explicit and detailed enough so as to 
permit a reasonable inference of what the file is likely to 
depict.  The unmistakable inference which arises from the 
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file name here is that its contents include material pertaining 
to the sexual exploitation of children. 
 
Further, the affidavit relates that Garland knew the file 
in question contained child pornography because he 
recognized the file=s SHA1 value, 
RGQCV2AC6XD3JE5KULOBAJWQTVBBXXHC, as one 
indicating child pornography.  This too is relevant to 
probable cause.  The affidavit explains the significance of the 
SHA1 value as a >digital fingerprint= and avers that the 
investigating officers were familiar with the SHA1 value 
associated with the file on Miknevich=s computer.  We 
conclude that the affidavit seeking the search warrant 
contained sufficient facts to support a finding that there was a 
fair probability that Miknevich possessed child pornography 
and that there was evidence of such possession at the location 
described in the affidavit.  The District Court=s order 
upholding the search warrant will be affirmed. 
 
 C. 
 
Because we find that the affidavit presented to the 
district justice was sufficient to provide a Asubstantial basis@ 
for finding a fair probability that evidence would be located 
on Miknevich=s computer, we need not reach the issue of 
good faith reliance on a warrant pursuant to Leon.  Therefore, 
and for the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District 
Court=s decision.   
 
 V. 
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As a final matter, Miknevich challenges his sentence of 
151 months imprisonment.  He argues this sentence violates 
his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.  We employ a 
plenary standard of review to a defendant=s Eighth 
Amendment challenge to his sentence.  United States v. 
Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2007).  Where, as here, an 
Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence was not brought 
before the District Court, we review for plain error.  United 
States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Finding no error, we will affirm Miknevich=s sentence. 
 
We have pointed out that the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes Apunishment >grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime.=@  United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 
62, 69 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 667 (1977)). Thus, A[a]lthough the [Supreme Court=s] 
proportionality principle applies to sentences for terms of 
years, only an extraordinary case will result in a constitutional 
violation.@ Walker, 473 F.3d at 79 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 
538 U.S. 63, 72, 77 (2003)). 
 
Generally, a sentence within the limits imposed by 
statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual under the 
Eighth Amendment.  See,  e.g., United States v. Johnson, 
451 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).  
This is so because we accord substantial deference to 
Congress, as it possesses broad authority to determine the 
types and limits of punishments for crimes.  United States v. 
Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 
omitted).  For that reason, the Supreme Court has made it 
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clear that, A>[o]utside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular 
sentences [will be] exceedingly rare.=@  Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263, 272 (1980)); see also United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 
71, 80 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 
We fail to see how this is such an extraordinary case.  
Miknevich=s guideline range was 151-188 months in prison.  
Here, the District Court sentenced Miknevich to 151 months 
imprisonmentBa sentence at the very bottom of the suggested 
sentencing range. Miknevich has not shown, as is his burden, 
that his sentence plainly violates the Eighth Amendment.  
Moreover, this case does not remotely resemble any of the 
cases in which the Supreme Court found a great disparity 
between crime and sentence so as to constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation.  See Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 (finding 
that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole for a repeat offender whose prior crimes were 
relatively minor and whose charged crime was minor and 
nonviolent violated the proportionality principle of the Eighth 
Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 358, 382 
(1910) (finding that a sentence of 15 years= imprisonment and 
hard labor for falsifying a public document was 
unconstitutional).   In sum, the District Court did not plainly 
err in sentencing Miknevich within the statutory limits, which 
neither we nor the Supreme Court has held to be cruel and 
unusual and Miknevich failed to meet his burden to establish 
otherwise. 
 
 VI. 
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The District Court=s judgment of conviction and 
sentence will be affirmed. 
 
